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I. Introduction 
The most significant development in 1969 in the area of 
trusts and estates was the codification of the law regarding 
powers of appointmene Other legislation subjects irrevoca-
ble inter vivos trusts to the jurisdiction of the Superior Court.2 
In the area of judicial developments, there were two cases 
of first impression. Estate of Pernas,3 dealt with the alloca-
tion as to principal or income of gains distributed from mutual 
funds. The other, Estate of Phillips,4 concerned the admis-
sion to probate of a will executed by a Californian who had 
been adjudicated an incompetent in Illinois prior to his com-
ing to California. 
II. Statutory Developments 
A. Powers of Appointment 
The Powers of Appointment Act, 5 which becomes operative 
on July 1, 1970, is the result of recommendations by the Cali-
fornia Law Revision Commission,6 based on a study1 by Pro-
fessor Richard R.B. Powell.s 
1. Stats. 1969, Chs. 155 and 468. 
2. Stats. 1969, Ch. 1172. 
3. 268 Cal. App.2d 275, 74 Cal. Rptr. 
8 (1968). 
4. 269 Cal. App. 2d 656, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 301 (1969). 
5. Civ. Code §§ 1380.1-1392.1. 
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6. The commission was directed by 
Resolution Chapter 130 of the Statutes 
of 1965 to make a study relating to 
powers of appointment. 
7. Research Study: Powers of Ap-
pointment in California, 19 Hast. L.J. 
1281 (1968). 
8. Professor of Law, University of 
California, Hastings College of the Law. 
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Professor Powell proposed the application of the common 
law pursuant to Estate of Sloan,9 but with statutory specifica-
tion of some items. In his study, Professor Powell describes 
his position: 
"There is no need to include in the statute a coverage of 
all the points possibly litigable concerning powers of ap-
pointment. The bar and the courts will be greatly 
helped, and the public interest will be served, by a statute 
which does spell out the "common law of California," 
on the core points as to which litigation can fairly be 
anticipated. This will eliminate the need for expensive 
research into the decisions of England and of our sister 
states as to the content of the common law on powers. 
At present the Restatement of Property can be regarded 
as probably a fair presentation of the common law, but 
a careful lawyer will feel compelled to dig out the deci-
sions and to weigh their conflicting ideas. So also will 
the careful judge. A declaratory statute will greatly 
minimize this wasteful process for both the bar and the 
bench."lo 
As a result of the Powell study, and recommendations by 
the Law Revision Commission, the important portions of the 
common law on powers were codified in the California Civil 
Code. l1 California now becomes the fourth state12 in the past 
six years to codify the common law on powers. 
The new Civil Code sections include some departures from 
the common law, and existing California law, that warrant 
additional discussion. Four specific areas of departure, sug-
gested by both Professor Powell and the Law Revision Com-
mission, were adopted by the legislature. 
9. 7 Cal. App.2d 319, 46 P.2d 1007 
(1935). Estate of Sloan held the com-
mon law of powers of appointment to be 
in effect in California unless modified 
by statute. This included the earlier 
common-law preference for nonexclu-
sive powers that was directly contrary 
to the "modern" common-law prefer-
ence. 
CAL LAW 1970 
10. Research Study: Powers of Ap-
pointment in California, 19 Hast. L.J. 
1281 at 1293 (1968). 
11. Civ. Code §§ 1380.1-1392.1. 
12. The three recent enactments were 
in New York (1964), Wisconsin (1965), 
and Michigan (1967). 
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1. Definition of General Power 
The federal and state death tax statutes have long been 
guides to attorneys in defining the terms general and special 
powers. These definitions differ from the common law. In 
an effort to adopt a definition consistent with prevailing views, 
section 1381.2 departs from the common law and uses 
definitions set forth in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,13 
and the California Revenue and Taxation Code.14 A similar 
provision was adopted by New York, Wisconsin, and Mich-
igan in their recent statute revisions. 
2. Exclusive v. Nonexclusive Powers 
The modern common-law preference for donees with special 
powers is to allow them to choose freely among the permis-
sible appointees unless the donor states a contrary intent. 
This is known as an "exclusive" power in the donee. Estate 
of Sloan16 held that California's preference is for a "nonexclu-
sive" power in the donee of a special power. This meant that 
the donee had to give something to each permissible appointee, 
whether or not this was the intention of the donor. 
Section 1387.3 adopts the modern preference of exclusive 
powers, but allows the donor to specify a minimum or maxi-
mum to one or more appointees. This reverses the holding of 
Sloan. 16 
3. Creditors' Rights 
Under the common law, creditors of a donee of a general 
power had limited rights. It was presumed that the donee had 
no rights of ownership and that the appointee took directly 
from the donor. 17 Thus, it was difficult for a creditor to reach 
13. I.R.C. 1954 § 2091(b)(1). ers of Appointment in California, 19 
14. Rev. & Tax. Code § 13692 Hast. L.J. 1281 at 1296 (1968). 
(1965). 17. Research Study: Powers of Ap-
15. 7 Cal. App.2d -, 46 P.2d 1007 pointment in California, 19 Hast. L.J. 
(1935). 1281 at 1294 (1968). 
16. 7 Cal. App.2d -, 46 P.2d 1007 
(1955). See also Research Study: Pow-
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appointive assets. Today, a donee with a general power of 
appointment, whether exercised or not, has the equivalent of 
a fee simple over the appointive assets because of Section 2041 
of the Internal Revenue Code.1s It seems inequitable to allow 
such property to be free from the claims of creditors of the 
donee. To remedy this, a portion of the new statute19 states 
that when the donee's other property is inadequate to satisfy 
the claims of creditors, property subject to a general power 
may be reached. This statute corresponds with ones recently 
enacted in New York (1964), Wisconsin (1965), and Mich-
igan (1967) .20 
4. Exercise of Powers by the Residuary Clause of 
Donee's Will 
The rule of California Probate Code section 1251 is the exact 
opposite of the common-law rule. 2 Professor Powell recom-
mended that this section be revised or eliminated in an effort 
to abrogate the harsh results that occurred in Estate of Carter.3 
In Carter, the testator-donee of a general testamentary power 
did not exercise the power. There was very convincing evi-
dence, apart from the will, that the donee did not intend to 
exercise the power. However, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia interpreted Probate Code section 125 to mean 
that a residuary clause in a will exercises a general power 
unless there is language contained within the will to indicate 
a contrary intent, or the donor has required the donee to 
make specific reference to the power in the will.4 
18. Section 2041(b)(I) defines a "gen-
eral power of appointment" as meaning 
a power that is exercisable in favor of 
the decedent, his estate, his creditors, 
or the creditors of his estate with cer-
tain stated exceptions. 
19. Civ. Code § 1390.3. 
20. Research Study: Powers of Ap-
pointment in California, 19 Hast. L.J. 
1281 at 1295 (1968). 
1. "A devise or bequest of all the 
testator's real or personal property, in 
express terms, or in any other terms de-
CAL LAW 1970 
noting his intent to dispose of all his 
real or personal property, passes all the 
real or personal property which he was 
entitled to dispose of by will at the 
time of his death, including property 
embraced in a power to devise." Stats 
1931, Ch. 2 § 1, p. 594, § 125. 
2. Research Study: Powers of Ap-
pointment in California, 19 Hast. L.J. 
1281 at 1291 (1968). 
3. 47 Cal.2d 200, 302 P.2d 301 
(1956.) 
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The exercise of a power by a residuary clause is now covered 
by Civil Code section 1386.2. This section will allow intro-
duction of evidence apart from the will to prove the donee's 
intent. Amendments to Probate Code sections 125 and 126 
now make these sections inoperative with respect to powers 
of appointment.6 
B. Trusts 
A new act, relating to the administration of inter vivos 
trusts, will become operative on November 1, 1970.6 The act 
will vest the Superior Court with jurisdiction over irrevocable 
inter vivos trusts if the trust instrument specifically so pro-
vides, or if the trustee petitions the Court to assume jurisdic-
diction of all or part of the trust under the act. It must be 
noted, however, that a trust instrument may prohibit the 
application of the act to all or a part of the trust. 
Two new code sections were added in 1969, relating to 
community property in trust. 7 Civil Code section 5113.5,8 
states that when a husband and wife transfer community prop-
erty into certain revocable trusts, their respective interests 
shall remain community property, unless the trust expressly 
provides otherwise. However, when the trust instrument pro-
vides a means of distribution in the event of death, new Pro-
bate Code section 204 provides that the provisions of the 
trust must prevail, notwithstanding the spouses' rights under 
Probate Code sections 201, 202 and 203. 
C. Administration of Estates 
The work of executors and administrators may be lessened 
due to the following code changes: 
1. Where the decedent left an undivided interest in proper-
ty, the executor or administrator of an estate is now allowed, 
5. Probate Code §§ 125 and 126 
were amended as part of the Powers of 
Appointment Act to specifically exempt 
them from applying to powers of ap-
pointment. 
6. Probate Code §§ 1137-1137.14. 
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7. Civ. Code § 5113.5 and Probate 
Code § 204. For a further discussion, 
see Gouff, Community Property and 
Family Law. 
8. Former Civ. Code § 164.8. 
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pursuant to Probate Code section 575, to maintain an action 
for partition without first obtaining court authority. 
2. When it is shown to be in the best interest of an estate 
to exchange any property of the estate, the court may allow 
such an exchange after the requirements under section 1200 
have been met. This procedure, under section 860 of the 
Probate Code, has been amended to allow the court to shorten 
the notice period or dispense with it completely when the ex-
change of stocks, bonds, or other securities, as defined in sec-
tion 771, is for different stocks, bonds, or securities. 
3. There are two instances under Probate Code section 
842, when estate property may be leased for a period of more 
than ten years: a lease for the purpose of production of 
minerals, oil, gas, or other hydrocarbon substances, and a lease 
for the growing of asparagus. Section 842.1 was added in 
1969, to allow the court to authorize the giving of a lease for 
over ten years on any estate property if it is agreeable with all 
persons interested in the estate; however, if any interested 
person objects, the court shall not make the order. 
4. In 1969, section 760.5 was added to the Probate Code, 
to allow an executor or administrator to contract with an auc-
tioneer to secure purchasers for any tangible personal property 
of an estate. Title to the property will pass upon receipt 
of the purchase price and delivery to the buyer, but the per-
sonal representative will be liable for the actual value until 
confirmation by the court. 
D. Guardians 
By amendment of section 1402 of the Probate Code,9 it is 
now possible for any person, not just parents, to appoint by 
will a guardian for the estate that they are leaving to a minor. 
This will allow the testator to choose a guardian to handle the 
9. Stats. 1969, Ch. 563, p. 231. "A 
parent may appoint a guardian by will 
or by deed for the property of any child 
of such parent, living or likely to be 
born, which such child may take from 
such parent by will or succession, and 
CAL LAW 1970 
any person may in a will appoint a 
guardian for the property of any minor, 
living or likely to be born, which such 
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particular property whom he feels will have the best interest of 
the minor in mind. 
E. Time Periods 
A reduction in the time required to probate an estate ap-
pears the goal of the legislature, which has reduced many time-
period requirements of the Probate Code. 
1. A person eligible to contest a will after probate must do 
so within 4 months after such probate, rather than the 6 
months previously allowed, according to revisions in Probate 
Code sections 380 and 384. 
2. In keeping with last year's shortening of the time for 
creditors to file claims, in 1969 section 702 was similarly 
changed to reduce from 6 months to 4 months the time credi-
tors have to file claims because of a delayed filing of affidavit 
of publication. 
3. When 2 months have elapsed after the first pUblication 
of notice to creditors, it is now possible under section 1000, 
to petition for preliminary distribution, and, under section 
1080, to file a petition to determine heirship. This is a change 
from 3 months and 4 months, respectively. 
III. Judicial Developments 
A. Trusts 
Elvira Pernas, the testator in Estate of Pernas,10 died in 
1953, leaving a will that created a testamentary trust. The 
trust named William A. Evans as a life beneficiary, with the 
remainder to three charitable organizations, but made no in-
dication of the testatrix's intent as to the allocation between 
principal and income. The principal assets of the trust were 
shares of corporations commonly known as mutual funds. 
During a 12-year period, the trustee became entitled to re-
ceive either cash or additional shares as distribution of capital 
10. 268 Cal. App.2d 275, 74 Cal. 
Rptr. 8 (1968). 
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gains realized by the fund. In each instance, the trustee 
chose to receive shares rather than cash. These shares were 
always allocated to the principal of the trust. 
On the filing of an accounting reflecting the trustee's alloca-
tion, the life beneficiary objected. The remaindermen ap-
pealed from the trial court's order that the capital gains dis-
tribution should have been allocated to income and disbursed 
to the life beneficiary. 
The decision in the Pernas case rests on an interpretation 
of the Principal and Income Act prior to its modification by 
the legislature in 1967. The present statute provides: 
"Distributions made from ordinary income by a regulated 
investment company or by a trust qualifying and electing 
to be taxed under federal law as a real estate investment 
trust are income. All other distributions made by the 
company or trust, including distributions from capital 
gains, depreciations, or depletion, whether in the form of 
cash or an option to take new stock or cash or an option 
to purchase additional shares, are principal."ll 
The Code also provides that in all other cases where the 
trustee has the option of receiving a dividend in either cash or 
shares, the dividend shall be considered as cash and deemed 
income, irrespective of the choice made by the trustee. Ex-
cepted are distributions from regulated-investment companies 
or real estate investment trusts. Prior to this 1967 change in 
the statute, the code provided: 
"Where the trustee shall have the option of receiving a 
dividend either in cash or in the shares of the declaring 
corporation, it shall be considered as a cash dividend 
and deemed income, irrespective of the choice made by 
the trustee."12 
The Court held that the 1967 amendment was expressly 
intended to change the law with respect to the allocation of 
distributions from mutual funds. Therefore, distributions of 
11. Civ. Code § 730.06(c). 
CAL LAW 1970 
12. Civ. Code § 730.07(b)(I) prior to 
Amendment, Stats. 1967, Ch. 726. 
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capital gains, whether in cash or shares, prior to 1967 were 
deemed to be income, and the trial court's opinion was af-
firmed. 
Estate of Talbot/3 a subsequent case also involving alloca-
tion of principal and income, involved stock in General Motors 
and Du Pont, rather than in an investment company. In Tal-
bot, the trust res included shares of stock in E.!. du Pont de 
Nemours, Inc. The du Pont Corporation owned a large block 
of shares in General Motors Corporation. As a result of 
antitrust litigation, the United States Government was able 
to compel du Pont to distribute all of its General Motors 
stock to its shareholders. 
The trustee of the Talbot trust received 544 shares of Gen-
eral Motors stock by virtue of its ownership of du Pont shares. 
The trustee chose to treat the General Motors stock as prin-
cipal rather than income available for a life tenant. In the 
absence of a clear expression of intent on the part of the tes-
tator creating the trust, the Court was required to determine 
whether the General Motors shares should be treated as prin-
cipal or income. 
Inasmuch as the trust had been created in 1931, and the 
principal and income statute14 is applicable only to trusts 
established after 1941, the statute had no application to this 
case. The Court applied the Pennsylvania rule,15 which was 
the law in California at the time of the creation of the Talbot 
trust. The Court also found persuasive authority in the Re-
statemenes for the proposition that an involuntary corporate 
13. 269 Cal. App.2d 526, 74 Cal. 
Rptr. 920 (1969). 
14. Cal. Civ. Code § 730.02, was re-
pealed by Cal. Stats. 1967, Ch. 1508 § 1, 
p. 3576, operative July 1, 1968. See 
§ 730.15. 
15. The Pennsylvania rule disregards 
the character of that received, such as 
cash dividend, stock dividend, or distri-
bution of assets, and considers, rather, 
the period of time during which the 
dividend or distribution was earned by 
the corporation. That which is found 
378 
to be earned only before the commence-
ment of a life estate is allocated to the 
corpus of the trust, while earnings whol-
ly earned after a life estate commenced 
is allocated entirely to income. In the 
event that the earnings do not fall clear-
ly into either category but are from 
both periods of time, a proper appor-
tionment is made between principal and 
income. 
16. "Where a corporation is directed 
by public authority to cease to hold 
shares of a subsidiary corporation, and 
CAL LAW 1970 
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distribution is a distribution of principal rather than income, 
and noted that the California principal and income statute,17 
while inapplicable, provides that distribution made pursuant to 
a court decree belong to principal rather than income. Final-
ly, the Court pointed out that the relative status of the life 
tenant and the remaindermen have remained unchanged inas-
much as the life tenant will continue to receive the income, 
although a portion of the dividends received in the trust will 
now flow from the General Motors Corporation rather than 
the Du Pont Corporation. Based on the foregoing, the Court 
held that the shares of General Motors Corporation that were 
distributed were a portion of the principal and were not al-
locable to income. 
B. Estates 
1. Capacity to Establish Domicile 
In Estate of Phillips,18 the Court held that an adjudicated 
incompetent may change his legal domicile if he has sufficient 
mental capacity to select and adopt a new one. Declared in-
competent in 1964 in Illinois, the decedent subsequently made 
two trips to California; the first a visit of one month, the latter 
for eleven months, terminated by his death. A few weeks 
prior to his death, he executed a will in which he stated, "I 
have now changed my domicile and residence to the State 
of California." That will was offered for probate by the 
named executor. Objections were filed by the Illinois ap-
pointed conservator of the person and estate of the dece-
dent. 
The basis for objection was the lack of capacity of an in-
competent to change his place of residence. The Court noted 
that residence, as used in the appropriate Probate Code sec-
tion,19 is synonymous with domicile. The Court, in its opin-
ion, uses the two terms interchangeably. 
it distributes such shares among its 
share holders, such distribution may be 
held to be in the nature of a partial 
liquidation and allocable to principal." 
Restatement, Trusts, 2d, § 236 (E). 
CAL LAW 1970 
17. Cal. Civ. Code § 730.06(b)(3). 
18. 269 Cal. App.2d 656, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 301 (1969). 
19. Probate Code § 301. 
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The acquisition of a new domicile, as defined by the Court, 
requires a physical change of residence, accompanied by an 
intent to make such change permanent or indefinite. In af-
firming the trial court decision to admit the will to probate, 
the Court of Appeal relied on the Restatement of Conflicts.20 
While this situation has not previously arisen in California, 
the majority view from other jurisdictions, as expressed in the 
Restatement, is as follows: 
"A person who is mentally deficient or of unsound mind 
can acquire a domicile as if he had normal mental ca-
pacity if he is able to choose a home.,,1 
The Court also relied on the analogous law in California hold-
ing that the fact of adjudication of incompetency does not 
warrant a finding of lack of testamentary capacity without 
other evidence. The court held: 
" . If an incompetent has the capacity to make a 
valid will under certain circumstances, he may also have 
the capacity to decide the place of his domicile if he is 
otherwise mentally alert and capable of choosing this 
home.,,2 
2. Estate-Related Torts 
In MacDonald v. Joslyn,3 the decedent left an estate in ex-
cess of $10,000,000. His eldest son requested that the hearing 
on the petition for probate of the will be postponed for two 
months. On the arrival of the new date for the hearing, the 
son filed a contest of the will on the grounds of fraud and un-
due influence. Six months later, after having discharged two 
successive attorneys and obtaining in propria persona a post-
ponement of the trial on the contest, a voluntary dismissal 
was filed. Subsequently, the executor named in the decedent's 
20. Restatement, Conflict of Laws, 3. 275 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
§ 40 (1934). 707 (1969). For further discussion of 
1. Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § this case, see York, REMEDIES, in this 
40 (1934). volume. 
2. 269 Cal. App.2d 656, 665, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 301, 307. 
380 CAL LAW 1970 12
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will filed an action for damages, based on malicious prosecu-
tion, for loss of executor's commissions, loss of trustee's fees, 
injury to his reputation, and mental anguish. 
Generally, a cause of action based on malicious prosecu-
tion requires a plaintiff to have obtained favorable termination 
in a prior proceeding in which he waS a defendant. The Court 
divided its comments on these prerequisites into two areas: 
being a defendant in a prior proceeding, and a favorable ter-
mination. The court said: 
"When the will contest was filed, the petitioner became 
in one sense a 'defendant' for the purposes of the trial 
of the contest. He was a person who was aggrieved by 
the conduct of the contestant who had filed the contest for 
a spiteful purpose and without probable cause.,,4 
The Court went on to say that a favorable termination need 
not have been a final determination of the controversy, be-
cause voluntary dismissal is a favorable termination even 
though it is made "without prejudice." The judgment of the 
trial court, awarding the decedent's intended executor the 
amount of commissions lost by the appointment of a public 
administrator during the pendency of the will contest was 
affirmed. 
Another estate-related tort case in Heyer v. Flaig,5 involv-
ing the negligence of an attorney in drafting a will. The sole 
question was the commencement of running of the statute of 
limitations against the claim of the testatrix's intended bene-
ficiaries. She had consulted her attorney, Flaig, prior to her 
marriage, disclosing her nuptial plans and requesting that a 
will be prepared leaving her entire estate to her two daughters. 
Flaig, the defendant here, apparently did not advise the tes-
tatrix of the consequences of a posttestamentary marriage. 
Ten days after the execution of the will prepared for her by 
4. 275 Cal. App.2d -, -, 79 Cal. 5. 70 Cal.2d 223, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225, 
Rptr. -, cites Probate Code § 371: 449 P.2d 161 (1969). For further dis-
"On the trial (of the will contest), the cussion of this case, see Moreau, TORTS, 
contestant is plaintiff and the petitioner in this volume. 
is defendant. . 
CAL LAW 1970 381 
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Flaig, testatrix married. Six months later, she died, and her 
recently acquired spouse claimed a portion of her estate.6 
The two daughters, who were the intended beneficiaries, 
brought an action against Flaig more than 2 years after the 
drafting of the will, but within 2 years from the testatrix's 
death. The State Supreme Court held that the attorney draft-
ing the will had a continuing duty to the testatrix to give effect 
to her testamentary wishes. The damage caused by his neg-
ligence was only potential until the testatrix's death, which 
prevented its correction. The Court said: 
"Because defendant owed plaintiffs this continuing duty 
the cause of action did not accrue nor the statute of 
limitations commence to run until the defendant's neg-
ligence became irremediable. m 
More important, perhaps, are the Court's comments on 
the rights of the intended beneficiaries to bring such an action. 
The right had been previously established in the earlier 
case of Lucas v. Hamm. 8 However, the Court appears to have 
enlarged the scope of liability to persons not in privity with one 
who, ex delicto, breaches a duty arising out of a contract. 
While the rule set forth in Lucas would have been a sufficient 
basis to uphold liability here, the Court further cites Connor 
v. Great Western Sav. & Loan Assn.,9 for the proposition that 
"liability may flow from relationships which are not ex-
pressed by contract between the parties not in 'privity' with 
each other . . . . ,,10 This thread of logic may be extended 
to other areas of the law in the future. 
3. Will Contests 
In addition to the contest-related tort action of Mac-
Donald v. Joslyn, there were several other will-contest matters 
6. His claim was based on Probate 9. 69 Cal.2d 850, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 
Code § 70. 447 P.2d 609 (1968). 
7. 70 Cal.2d 225, 230, 74 Cal. Rptr. 10. 70 Cal. 2d 223, 228, 74 Cal. 
225,229,449 P.2d 161, 165 (1969). Rptr. 225, 228, 449 P.2d 161, 164 
8. 56 Cal.2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, (1969). 
364 P.2d 685 (1961) cert. den. 368 
U.S. 987, 7 L.Ed.2d 525, 82 S.Ct. 603. 
382 CAL LAW 1970 
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that warrant comment. Estate of Collinsll dealt with the as-
signment of one's interest in an estate solely for the purpose of 
contesting a will. Simply stated, the appellant in Collins 
sought out relatives of a testator and obtained assignments so 
he could commence will contests. While the right to contest 
a will may be assigned by an heir,12 assignments made to heir 
hunters are against public policy and therefore void. Because 
the validity of an assignment that would enable one to com-
mence a will contest depends on the facts of each individual 
case, it is difficult to set forth a universal rule of law. Here, 
the Court described that fact as follows: 
" . when a non-lawyer acts for prospective bene-
ficiaries under arrangements providing for his payment 
of litigation expenses and the non-lawyer controls the 
litigation instituted on behalf of the beneficiaries, such 
procedure amounts to commercial exploitation of the 
legal profession."13 
Therefore, if a will contest is brought by an assignee, one 
of the first areas of inquiry on the part of the attorney repre-
senting the proponents of the will should be the facts surround-
ing the assignment. The Collins case holds that it is proper 
to determine the validity of the assignment prior to a determi-
nation on the merits of the contest. 
To successfully contest a will on the ground of undue in-
fluence, it must be shown, in addition to the other requisite 
factors of confidential relationship and undue benefit, that 
the benefitting person actually participated in the preparation 
of the will. Estate of Kerner,14 turned on such a point. There, 
the deceased had the advice of an attorney who prepared his 
will. The attorney's declaration in support of a motion for 
summary judgment averred that he was never contacted by 
the persons who were alleged to have exerted undue influence 
over the testator. The Court said: 
11. 268 Cal. App.2d 86, 73 Cal. Rptr. 13. 268 Cal. App.2d 86, 91, 73 Cal. 
599 (1968). Rptr. 599, 602 (1968). 
12. 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, 14. 275 Cal. App.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 
p. 3230 (1960). 289 (1969). 
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"Accordingly, if the person alleged to have exerted undue 
influence has not actively participated in the prepara-
tion or execution of the will, undue influence is not es-
tablished, even though such person may have been in a 
confidential relationship with the testator and have un-
duly profited from the Will."15 
No affidavits or declarations having been filed in opposition 
to the motion, summary judgment was granted and affirmed 
on appeal. 
4. Interpretation of Wills 
Estate of Becker16 involved a controversy between intestacy 
laws and the terms of a will. Subsequent to execution of her 
will, the testatrix had purchased nonrefundable annuities. A 
suit by the administratrix to recover the purchase price of 
the annuities based on the testatrix's incompetency was settled 
for $25,000. The question was whether these funds passed 
under the terms of the will to a charitable trust or by intestacy. 
The will had used the words "all income from my several bank 
accounts, also all income derived from all my stocks ... " in 
making the bequest. 
Clearly, the fund in controversy did not fall into either 
category specified in the will. Therefore, the Court con-
sidered whether the words "all income" were words of limita-
tion or words of enlargement. The Court said: 
". . . if the words derived from my several bank ac-
counts, also all income derived from my stocks are con-
strued as words of enlargement then the words merely 
indicate two sources from which income may be derived 
and do not exclude other sources of income. ,,17 
The opinion quotes at length from Page On WillS18 in pointing 
out when two inconsistent descriptions are contained within 
15. 275 Cal. App.2d -, -, 80 Cal. 17. 270 Cal. App.2d 31, 35, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 289, 291. Rptr. 359, 361. 
16. 270 Cal. App.2d 31, 75 Cal. Rptr. 18. Page on Wills (New Rev.) § 
359 (1969). 33.34. 
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a will, one general and the other more particular, the court 
must give effect to the testator's intent as ascertained from 
the entire will. From a latter portion of the will appointing 
an executor of "all above properties," the Court concluded 
that the testatrix intended to dispose of her entire estate, in-
cluding those funds acquired after her death. Thus, the after-
acquired assets passed under the terms of the will. 
5. Instructions to Personal Representative 
The right to petition the Court for instructions pursuant to 
the Probate Code19 was before the Court in Estate of Webb. 20 
The decedent's stepdaughter, a legatee named in the will. 
petitioned the Court for instructions to the administrator. The 
petition was denied on the basis that only the legal representa-
tive of the estate may petition the court for instructions. This 
type of relief is not available to one who is merely a legatee. 
In Estate of Pratt/ a Court exceeded its jurisdiction in or-
dering the occupant of estate property to either vacate or post 
a bond for the rental value pending a determination of title to 
the property. A special administrator had been appointed 
pending a determination of multiple contests to several docu-
ments, each purporting to be the last will of a deceased who 
left no heirs. The ultimate decision of the contests was re-
quired to ascertain the distributee of certain real property that 
was an asset of the estate. One person, claiming a right to 
the property under one of the contested documents, occupied 
the property. After a petition for instructions by the special 
administrator, the Court ordered the occupant to either vacate 
the property or post a bond to secure the payment of the rea-
sonable rental value in the event the occupant was found to 
have no right to the property. 
The reviewing coure stated that between the special ad-
ministrator and persons not related to the deceased by blood, 
the sole right to possession is in the administrator. The opin-
ion goes on to say that since the Probate Court had no juris-
19. Probate Code § 88. 1. 274 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
20. 269 Cal. App.2d 172, 74 Cal. 495 (1969). 
Rptr. 710 (1969). 2. Citing Probate Code § 581. 
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diction to determine title to the property between the adminis-
trator and the claimant, the Court's order exceeded its juris-
diction. A petition for instructions was the proper manner 
for the administrator to obtain directions from the Court as 
to whether the property should be rented, and if so, the terms 
of such rental. Thus armed with such instructions, the ad-
ministrator could negotiate with the occupant for a suitable 
rental agreement. The Court states that failing there, the 
administrator's sole remedy would be a plenary action at law 
against the occupant, presumably for unlawful detainer. 
6. Guardians and Conservators 
Only a person interested in the well-being of a conservatee 
may object to the termination of a conservatorship, was the 
holding in Conservatorship of the Estate of Stewart. 3 The 
conservatee, upon recovery from a heart condition that caused 
his estate to be placed in a conservatorship, filed his petition 
for its termination. Objections were made by parties who 
claimed damages for breach of contract. The Court pointed 
out that in a conservatorship, title to the estate does not vest in 
the conservator. Rather, the conservator acts as an agent for 
the conservatee. Whatever rights objectors had against the 
estate during the conservatorship continue against the con-
servatee after his restoration to capacity. The Court's order 
discharging the conservator operates only between the two 
parties to the conservatorship, that is, the conservator and 
conservatee. Because the rights of the creditors or claimants 
are preserved, such persons do not have standing to object 
to the termination of the conservatorship. 
Estate of Ehle4 held that the attorney for the guardian may 
recover attorney's fees from the guardianship without filing 
a creditor's claim in the estate of the deceased when a ward 
dies leaving an estate to be probated. The attorney, having 
commenced a suit based on a denied claim in the estate of 
a deceased, subsequently requested fees in the petition and 
final accounting in the guardianship. The Court said: 
3. 276 Cal. App.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 4. 267 Cal. App.2d 24, 72 Cal. Rptr. 
738 (1969). 474 (1968). 
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"Attorneys' fees for services rendered to the guardian on 
behalf of the ward and the estate of the guardianship are 
proper expenses of the guardian to be paid out of the 
guardianship assets, and it is not necessary to file a claim 
therefore in the estate of a deceased ward in order to 
protect the right to enforce a claim for such services in 
the guardianship proceedings. "5 
To further secure the payment of a proper expense of the 
guardianship, the Court will impose a lien on the estate in the 
event the assets have been transferred to an administrator or 
executor. 
5. 267 Cal. App.2d 24, 29, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 474, 477-478. 
* 
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